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Emotions are thought to be situated in social and cultural contexts, 
yet neuroscience approaches to human emotion have mostly overlooked the role 
of context in shaping emotional brain states. Here, we propose that instances 
of fear and sadness, and their corresponding neural representations, are 
shaped by social and cultural contexts. Using fMRI, we assessed how social 
contexts (i.e., the presence or absence of others) and cultural contexts 
(i.e., participants’ exposure to Chinese vs. American cultural norms) altered 
brain activity associated with experiences of fear and sadness. We find brain 
states associated with fear and sadness are an interaction between the 
emotion category being experienced and the contexts in which experience 
occurs. We also find time spent in the U.S. predicted the extent to which 
Chinese participants’ neural responses during sadness resembled those of 
Americans. These findings suggest emotions—and their neural correlates—are 
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Scientists have long sought to understand how the human brain creates 
emotions (Bard, 1928; Cannon, 1929; Darwin, 1859/2009; James 1890/1994; 
MacLean 1949; Panksepp, 1982; Papaz, 1937). Often, this search has resulted 
in attempts to characterize emotion categories such as fear or sadness with 
invariant neurobiological profiles, unaltered by the context in which they 
are experienced (Lindquist et al., 2012). Yet the feelings, behaviors, 
physiology and cognitions accompanying emotions vary substantially across 
contexts (Chang & Algoe, 2019; Coifman et al., 2016, Power & Dalgleish, 2015, 
Siegal et al., 2018). According to some models of emotion (Barrett, 2006; 
Frijda, 1988; Scherer, 2009; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), emotions are highly 
situated and intrinsically linked to the context in which they are 
experienced. Therefore, insofar as the feelings, behaviors, physiology, and 
cognitions associated with an emotion category are supported by a brain 
state, there should be significant and meaningful variation in the neural 
representation of the same emotion category across contexts. Here, we 
investigated how both the social and cultural context relate to patterns of  
brain activity during instances of fear and sadness using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). 
Human Emotion and Its Neural Correlates 
Much research has examined the neural correlates of negative emotion 
categories such as fear and sadness due to their presumed link to mental 
illness (Leshin & Lindquist, 2020; Power & Dalgleish, 2015). Such research 
often explicitly averages across the contexts in which instances of fear and 
sadness are experienced (see Ciric et al., 2017; Davidson et al., 2000; 
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Kragel et al., 2018); however, statistical averages may provide a profile 
that fails to characterize any single instance in the sample (Molenaar & 
Campbell, 2009). More recent approaches conceive of emotion categories (e.g., 
fear) as a population of variable brain states (Barrett, 2017). fMRI studies 
that use multivariate pattern classifications (Kassam et al., 2013; Kragel & 
LaBar, 2015; Saarimäki et al., 2015) support this notion by showing that the 
populations associated with fear and sadness vary across contexts. For 
instance, the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex—a brain region associated 
with visceromotor control (see Lindquist et al. 2012)—contributes to patterns 
for the category of fear in some (Kragel & LaBar 2015), but not other studies 
(Saarimäki et al. 2015). 
Moreover, previous evidence supports the notion that the context in 
which an emotion category is experienced may shape and constrain the brain 
representations of that emotion. For instance, experiencing threat in the 
context of conspecifics has been linked to brain activation in areas not only 
implicated in emotion, such as the amygdala (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010), but 
also in areas implicated in social cognition, such as the temporal poles and 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Vieira et al., 2020; Wilson-Mendenhall et 
al., 2011). These findings may reflect and support behavioral work showing 
that emotions are experienced more intensely in the context of others, 
particularly familiar others, than when experienced alone (Jakobs et al., 
1996); further, the presence of others may instigate the need to monitor and 
regulate one’s affective states to conform to social norms, which in turn may 
amplify negative emotional experiences (Bastian et al., 2012; Bastian et al., 
2017). Hence, it may be that when humans find themselves experiencing emotion 
in the context of other conspecifics, the brain representations underlying 
their experience of emotion go above and beyond prototypical patterns of 
activation, such as in the amygdala (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010), and instead 
further incorporate brain areas that support the immediate context—here, the 
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need to consider the presence of conspecifics (Vrtička et al., 2013).  
Culture may also shape and constrain the brain representations of 
emotion. A person’s cultural context encompasses both their socioecological 
context as well as the values, norms, icons, and lay theories to which they 
adhere (Gelfand et al., 2017; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Previous research 
that has examined the impact of culture on perceptions, behaviors and 
experiences related to emotion has relied heavily on differences between 
individualist vs. collectivist cultures (Kitayama et al., 2006; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Oyserman et al., 2002). Individuals 
in collectivist cultures, compared to individuals from individualist 
cultures, are likely to conceptualize themselves as aspects of groups, 
prioritize in-group goals, focus on context more than the content in making 
attributions, and foreground external rather than internal processes as 
determinants of social behaviors (Triandis, 2001). Indeed, when asked to 
infer a target’s emotional state, participants from collectivist cultures—
often from Japan, Korea or Mainland China—are more likely to reference 
surrounding faces to infer the target’s emotional state; in contrast, 
participants from individualist cultures—often of European or American 
descent—are more likely to focus directly on the target to infer the target’s 
emotional state (Masuda et al., 2008).  
Similar to cultural differences in emotion perception, cultural 
differences in behaviors linked to emotion regulation have also been 
documented. For instance, although the use of suppression to regulate one’s 
emotions has putatively deleterious effects on physical and psychological 
outcomes (John & Gross, 2004), these effects are culturally bound; the use of 
suppression in collectivist cultures benefits individuals interpersonally, 
whereas the use of suppression in individualist cultures often harms 
individuals interpersonally (Matsumoto et al., 2008). These latter findings 
may reflect an individual’s cultural orientation to prioritize group harmony 
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vs. personal happiness (Kitayama et al., 2006). Indeed, in the context of 
emotion experience, individuals from collectivist cultures are more likely to 
foster socially engaging emotions that prioritize groups, such as friendly 
and welcoming feelings, whereas individuals from individualist cultures are 
more likely to foster socially disengaging emotions that prioritize the self, 
such as pride (Kitayama et al., 2006). 
Altogether, these behavioral findings demonstrate that differences in 
emotion exist between collectivist and individualist cultures, and it follows 
that these differences may be supported by distinctive brain states, insofar 
as brain development is likely modified through sustained engagement in 
cultural practices (Han & Ma, 2015; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). However, almost 
no research has examined how culture moderates the neural correlates of 
emotional experiences. Existing research on culture, emotion and the human 
brain mainly examines cultural differences in the perception of facial 
expressions (Chiao et al., 2008; Moriguchi et al., 2005) or the suffering of 
others, that is, participants are often instructed to empathize with in-group 
or out-group members (Cheon et al., 2011; de Greck et al., 2012; Derntl et 
al., 2012). Overall, these latter findings show that individuals show greater 
amygdala activation for in-group (vs. out-group) members, suggesting greater 
salience for members in one’s culture (e.g., Chia et al., 2008). In studies 
that instruct participants from Eastern (vs. Western) cultures to empathize 
with depicted others, participants from Eastern cultures, relative to 
participants from Western cultures, typically show greater activation in 
brain areas implicated in emotion regulation (e.g., frontal gyrus), 
suggesting that participants from Eastern cultures are perhaps likelier to 
engage in rapid and implicit emotion regulation when confronted with negative 




The Present Study 
Here, we examine how the social and cultural context interact with the 
emotion experienced to alter participants’ brain activity during emotion 
experience. We manipulated the social context by inducing instances of fear 
and sadness using social vs. non-social evocative images (i.e., the presence 
or absence of depicted others, respectively). Drawing from well-established 
cultural differences between Eastern and Western societies as outlined above, 
we manipulated the cultural context by recruiting Mainland Chinese and 
European-American participants living in the US. Following an interesting set 
of findings that demonstrate “emotional acculturation”—a tendency for a 
person’s emotional perceptions, behaviors and experiences to conform to those 
of their host culture (De Leersnyder, 2017), we further examined how exposure 
to Western culture (i.e., months lived in the US) predicted variation in 
brain states associated with fear and sadness. 
We predicted emotional brain states would be a product of the emotion 
category experienced and the context(s) in which it was experienced. First, 
we predicted 2-way interactions wherein the social and cultural contexts each 
interacted with the emotion category being experienced. Specifically, we 
predicted that the neural correlates of fear and sadness would differ across 
social and non-social contexts, such that social contexts would be associated 
with greater activation in brain areas implicated in social cognition (e.g., 
mPFC) than non-social contexts. Additionally, we predicted that the neural 
correlates of fear and sadness would differ between Chinese and European-
American participants, such that Chinese native participants would show 
greater activation in brain areas implicated in behavioral inhibition (e.g., 
frontal gyrus) than European-American participants. 
Second, we predicted 3-way interactions, such that the neural 
correlates of fear and sadness would differ as a product of the combined 
effects of social and cultural contexts. For instance, we predicted that 
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European-American participants may show greater activation in the insula—an 
area implicated in somatovisceral representations (Lindquist et al., 2012)—
than Chinese native participants for social instances of fear and sadness 
since stimuli predominantly depicted in-group members (i.e., White depicted 
others). Using time spent in the US as a predictor, we additionally predicted 
an “emotional acculturation” effect whereby Chinese participants’ neural 
responses to instances of fear and sadness would begin to resemble those of 
Americans as a function of how long they had lived in the US and been exposed 
to US cultural norms. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-nine right-handed, native or proficient English-speaking 
participants underwent fMRI. All participants were recruited from The 
University of North Carolina community, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and none reported neurological or psychiatric disease. Twenty-four 
were United States natives of European-American descent and 25 were Chinese 
natives who had lived in Mainland China for at least 18 years (Myears in China = 
19.04 ± 2.01, range = 18-25 years) before moving to the United States (Myears in 
US = 1.74 ± 1.26, range = 0-4 years). To assess proficiency in spoken and 
written English in our Chinese sample, we used scores on the Test of English 
as a Foreign Language (TOEFL; https://www.ets.org/toefl). Specifically, we 
required that participants attain a minimum score of 100/120 on the TOEFL to 
participate in the present study. There were no significant sex differences 
in TOEFL scores (median score = 107, range = 100-117) or time lived in both 
China or the US in our Chinese sample.  
One participant was excluded from the initial sample due to excessive 
head motion (> 2.0mm slice-to-slice on ≥ 10% of slices) during the fMRI 
experiment. An additional 3 participants were excluded because they failed to 
respond on 10% or more of the trials in the scanner. The final sample was 
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thus 45 participants who were matched on age and sex (22 European-American 
[11 female] with Mage = 21.87 years ± 3.15 and 23 Chinese Natives [12 female] 
with Mage = 20.78 years ± 2.42; overall age range = 18-31 years). The research 
protocol was approved by The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Institutional Review Board, and all participants provided written informed 
consent before participation.  
Materials 
We chose to study fear and sadness because they are both unpleasant 
states that are associated with similar levels of arousal in standardized 
image sets (Mikels et al., 2005), they occur across a range of contexts 
(Power & Dalgleish, 2015), and are often linked to affective disorders 
(Leshin & Lindquist, 2020). To induce fear and sadness, we used visual 
stimuli (i.e., emotionally evocative images) in conjunction with mental 
immersion (i.e., mental representations of novel events depicted in the 
images) since they are reliable inducers of both fear and sadness (Salas et 
al., 2012; Siedlecka & Denson, 2018).  
One hundred and eighty images selected from the International Affective 
Picture System (Mikels et al., 2005), Open Affective Standardized Image Set 
(Kurdi et al., 2016) and Nencki Affective Picture System (Marchewka et al., 
2013) were presented across 5 fMRI runs (36 images per run). The 180 images 
were piloted via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to assess discrete 
emotionality and sociality. In the pilot study, participants (N = 444; 54% 
female, Mage = 37.13 years, SD = 11.48, range = 18-73) used a 9-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all, 9 = very) to rate the extent to which the images 
evoked feelings of fear, sadness, or neutral affect. Moreover, using the same 
Likert scale, participants rated the extent to which they considered the 
images to be “social” (i.e., to use their judgment to decide whether the 
image depicted social content or not). Images deemed fearful (Mfear|fear = 5.28) 
were rated as more fearful, on average, than sad (Mfear|sad = 4.08), p < .001; 
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images deemed sad (Msad|sad = 5.63) were rated as more sad, on average, than 
fearful (Msad|fear = 3.58), p < .001; and images deemed social (Msocial = 4.03) 
were rated as more social, on average, than the images deemed non-social (Mnon-
social = 2.48), p < .001. Notably, the images deemed social in the fMRI 
experiment all involved pictures of other people, whereas those deemed non-
social were devoid of other people. Fear and sad conditions did not differ in 
valence (p = .839) or arousal (p = .136), nor did non-social and social 
images differ in valence (p = .739) or arousal (p = .716). Pilot data showed 
no significant differences between non-social and social conditions on fear 
or sad ratings (ps > .60), but participants in the current study nonetheless 
rated the social images as greater in fear (b = 0.34, SE = 0.07, t = 4.71, p 
< .001) and sadness (b = 0.35, SE = 0.07, t = 4.78, p < .001) than the non-
social images. There were no significant differences in ratings between 
Chinese Natives and European-Americans. 
Design 
 Using images allowed us to manipulate the emotional and social context 
in the MRI scanner by exposing participants to a range of emotionally 
evocative situations (fearful, sad, and neutral) that were either social 
(e.g., encountering knife-wielding individuals, people attending a funeral) 
or non-social (e.g., seeing an impending tornado, injured animals). In the 
scanner, participants were instructed to immerse themselves in the images 
being presented to them as if they were actually present in the depicted 
events. A rating scale followed every image and prompted participants to rate 
either how “afraid,” “sad,” or “neutral” they felt, which corresponded to the 
emotion condition presented in the preceding image (i.e., fear, sad, or 
neutral, respectively). Participants reported the intensity of their 
subjective emotional experience on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 
e.g., sad, 5 = very, e.g., sad) using a button-box in their right hand. 
Images and rating slides were each presented for 4000ms and were followed by 
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a fixation cross whose inter-stimulus interval (ISI) was generated by the 
Optseq algorithm (https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/) (MISI = 2000ms). 
Stimuli (images, rating scales, and fixations) were presented electronically 
using the E-Prime 3.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), 
which was synchronized with trigger pulses from the scanner. Participants 
immersed themselves in evocative images and rated their subjective emotional 
experiences across 5 experimental runs. See Figure 1 below for an 





Note. An event-related design. Before each experimental run, participants 
were reminded to immerse themselves in the images being presented to them as 




In defining culture as a predictor of brain function, we used 
participants’ cultural origin (Mainland China vs. United States) as a 
between-person factor. In addition to drawing from the tradition of examining 
cultural differences between Eastern and Western societies, we chose to 
recruit Chinese native participants because among East Asian countries, East 
Asians of Chinese origin are typically significantly lower in individualistic 
values and significantly higher in collectivistic values relative to their 
European-American counterparts (Oyserman et al., 2002). 
In defining exposure to Western culture as a predictor of brain 
function, we used time (i.e., months) spent in the US (as done in Consedine 
et al., 2014; De Leersnyder et al., 2011) as a continuous, standardized 
covariate. This latter value ranged from -1.09 to 1.90 (unstandardized values 
in months: 4 to 302 months), with our Chinese participants falling below zero 
and our US participants above zero. It bears note that no one in our 
European-American sample reported living elsewhere in their life other than 
the United States. 
Procedure 
Research staff met participants at the Biomedical Research Imaging 
Center at the UNC School of Medicine. Prior to entering the scanner, 
participants underwent a practice session wherein research staff trained the 
participants on the mental immersion involved in the fMRI experiment. Before 
commencing the practice trials, participants were told they would need to 
create mental representations centered on the depicted events in an effort to 
place themselves in the depicted events.  
Participants then completed 5 fMRI experimental runs, each lasting 6 
minutes, and presented in random order without replacement. Participants were 
reminded immediately before each experimental run to immerse themselves in 
the images as if they were actually present in the depicted events. After the 
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fMRI experiment, participants filled out demographic questionnaires outside 
the scanner on a laptop computer. All participants were debriefed and none 
reported ever being aware that the experimental objective was to test for 
neural differences in response to different emotional experiences (fear vs. 
sad vs. neutral), different forms of context (social vs. non-social), and 
different cultural backgrounds (Chinese vs. European-American). 
Data Acquisition 
Imaging Parameters 
A 3 Tesla Siemens PRISMA whole-body scanner was used to acquire brain 
imaging data. Structural image acquisition included a T1*magnetization-
prepared rapid-acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE; slice thickness = 0.8mm; 
208 slices; TR = 2400ms; TE = 2.22ms; matrix = 320 x 320; field of view (FoV) 
= 256mm; voxel size = 0.8 x 0.8 x 0.8mm3; sagittal plane) and a T2*-weighted, 
matched-bandwidth (MBW), high resolution, anatomical scan (slice thickness = 
3mm; 38 slices; TR = 5700ms; TE = 65ms; matrix = 192 x 192; FoV = 230mm; 
voxel size = 1.2 x 1.2 x 3mm3). Functional image acquisition included 
collection of T2*-weighted echoplanar images (EPI; 37 slices; slice thickness 
= 3mm; TR = 2000ms; TE = 25ms; matrix = 92 x 92; FoV = 230mm; voxel size = 
2.5 x 2.5 x 3mm3). MBW and EPI scans were obtained at an oblique axial 
orientation in order to maximize brain coverage and minimize dropout in 
frontal orbital regions. Slices were acquired in an interleaved ascending 
order. 
Data Preprocessing 
Image preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using the 
Statistical Parametric Mapping software package (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre 
for Neuroimaging at UCL, London, UK). Preprocessing steps involved spatial 
realignment to correct for head motion (participants’ head motion did not 
exceed 1.5mm between-slice displacement); coregistration of all images to the 
high-resolution T1*MPRAGE structural scan; and segmentation into grey matter, 
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white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid. Transformation matrices used in MPRAGE 
segmentation were applied to MBW and EPI images to warp them into the 
standard stereotactic space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI). EPI images were smoothed using an 8mm Gaussian kernel, full-width-at-
half maximum to increase signal-to-noise ratios in the functional images. The 
general linear model in SPM8 was then used to convolve each trial with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function. Low-frequency drift across the time 
series was removed using a high-pass temporal filter with a 128s cutoff, and 
a restricted maximum likelihood algorithm with an autoregressive model order 
of 1 was used to estimate serial autocorrelations. 
Data Analysis 
The fMRI task was modeled using an event-related design with trial 
duration corresponding to picture presentation (4000ms). Fixed-effects models 
included a general linear model for each condition of interest (i.e., Social 
Neutral, Non-Social Neutral, Social Fear, Non-Social Fear, Social Sadness, 
and Non-Social Sadness). The jittered inter-trial periods (ISIs) were not 
modeled and served as the implicit baseline for the task. Six contrasts coded 
as dummy-codes and corresponding to the conditions of interest were then 
computed at the individual level. To isolate the voxels unique to the six 
conditions of interest, six contrasts coded as contrast codes were also 
computed at the individual level (i.e., Social Neutral > All [i.e., the other 
5 conditions], Non-Social Neutral > All, Social Fear > All, Non-Social Fear > 
All, Social Sadness, > All and Non-Social Sadness > All). 
 Random effects group-level analyses were run on all individual subject 
contrasts using GLMFlex, which corrects for variance-covariance inequality, 
removes outliers and sudden activation changes in the brain, partitions error 
terms, and analyzes all voxels containing data 
(http://mrtools.mgh.harvard.edu/index.php/GLM_Flex). Group-level analyses 
also involved whole-brain regressions using culture as a between-person 
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factor (i.e., Chinese vs. American) and acculturation as a continuous 
covariate (i.e., months spent in the US, standardized). Correction for 
multiple comparisons was run using a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 
iterations through the updated version (July, 2017) of 3dFWHMx and 3dClustSim 
programs from the Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software package 
(https://afni.nimh.nih.gov) using the group-level brain mask. The simulation 
resulted in a voxel-wise threshold of p < .0001 and a minimum cluster size of 
range 21-65 voxels for the whole brain, corresponding to p < .05, Family-Wise 
Error (FWE) corrected. 
Results 
We focus on analyses that tested our a priori hypotheses that the 
neural representation of emotion categories is described by interactions 
between the emotion category and the social and cultural context conditions 
in which they occur. We present main effects of emotion and social conditions 
in Appendix 1. Note that these findings generally replicate meta-analytic 
evidence examining the brain regions consistently associated with fear and 
sadness (Lindquist et al. 2012), and social and non-social situations 
(Alcalá-López et al., 2017), respectively. 
Situated Fear 
 We predicted, and found, that the neural correlates of the emotion 
category fear differed across social and non-social conditions. Relative to 
all other conditions, fear in the non-social condition was characterized by 
increased activation in the mid-cingulate cortex (MCC) and medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (t > 4.05, k > 21, p < .0001; p < .05, FWE corrected). 
In contrast, fear in the social condition was characterized by increased 
activation in inferior frontal, lateral and medial temporal, and visual 
cortex, and the cerebellum relative to all other conditions (t > 4.05, k > 
24, p < .0001; p < .05, FWE corrected) (see Table 1, Figure 2). 
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Table 1 
Neural Regions Showing Significant Activation During Non-Social and Social 
Conditions of Fear Relative to All Other Conditions 
Contrast: [Non-Social Fear > All] MNI 
L/R Region Cluster 
size  
t-value x y z 
L MCC 151 5.85 -6 -36 44 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 73 5.49 -36 -82 38 
L Middle Orbital Gyrus 70 5.40 -24 36 -14 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 155 5.18 -20 4 56 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 155 5.12 -18 20 62 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 155 4.66 -18 22 54 
L IFG (p. Triangularis) 34 5.06 -44 36 10 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 69 4.87 -14 56 4 
L Middle Orbital Gyrus 69 4.76 -36 50 4 
L Superior Orbital Gyrus 69 4.61 -22 58 4 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 28 4.74 54 -44 54 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 22 4.44 30 16 58 
       
Contrast: [Social Fear > All] 
L/R Region Cluster 
size  
t-value x y z 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 3915 13.76 50 -68 8 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 3915 12.36 46 -74 2 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 3915 11.88 56 -48 12 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 3915 9.30 52 -42 20 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 3915 7.77 66 -44 16 
R Fusiform Gyrus 3915 6.22 26 -86 -2 
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 3915 6.20 28 -92 -8 
R Cerebellum (VI) 3915 5.42 34 -78 -14 
R Calcarine Gyrus 3915 5.14 22 -98 8 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 3930 13.01 -46 -74 8 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3930 11.11 -54 -60 14 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3930 10.98 -46 -66 20 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3930 10.90 -48 -56 18 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3930 10.51 -50 -56 8 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3930 10.29 -56 -52 14 
L Fusiform Gyrus 3930 7.63 -40 -42 -18 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 3930 6.97 -42 -74 30 
L Supramarginal Gyrus 3930 6.68 -56 -48 30 
L Fusiform Gyrus 3930 5.84 -42 -56 -18 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 3930 5.36 -42 -22 -20 
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 3930 5.20 -66 -46 20 
L Fusiform Gyrus 3930 5.03 -38 -74 -12 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3930 4.93 -66 -50 0 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 3930 4.70 -42 -16 -26 
R Precuneus 2464 11.31 2 -58 32 
R Precuneus 2464 10.63 4 -50 26 
L Precuneus 2464 9.20 -6 -54 40 
L Precuneus 2464 7.69 -6 -52 50 
R Precuneus 2464 5.89 8 -50 52 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 1460 11.01 54 0 -18 
R Medial Temporal Pole 1460 8.80 42 22 -30 
R Temporal Pole 1460 8.15 32 10 -26 
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R Middle Temporal Gyrus 1460 7.28 52 -8 -12 
R Medial Temporal Pole 1460 5.05 54 14 -18 
R Fusiform Gyrus 745 9.93 42 -42 -18 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 745 6.56 46 -26 -18 
R Cerebellum (VI) 745 5.06 38 -40 -30 
R Cerebellum (VI) 745 4.50 36 -58 -24 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 1340 9.07 -60 -4 -18 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 1340 8.09 -54 -10 -14 
L Medial Temporal Pole 1340 7.40 -38 18 -28 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 1340 6.91 -50 2 -22 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 1340 5.54 -52 -16 -4 
L Medial Temporal Pole 1340 5.37 -48 12 -32 
L Temporal Pole 1340 4.50 -30 6 -24 
R Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 8.49 4 50 34 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 6.44 -2 60 12 
R Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 6.14 8 52 20 
R Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 5.56 8 48 12 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 5.34 -8 62 32 
R Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 4.96 6 62 30 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 1414 4.35 -4 66 26 
R Rectal Gyrus 854 8.45 6 48 -14 
L Rectal Gyrus 854 7.68 -4 46 -16 
L Rectal Gyrus 854 5.76 -4 28 -20 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) 326 8.10 -46 28 -4 
L IFG (p. Triangularis) 326 5.78 -50 24 6 
L IFG (p. Triangularis) 326 5.78 -52 22 14 
R Cerebellum (IX) 445 8.09 6 -50 -42 
L Cerebellum (IX) 445 7.73 -8 -52 -42 
R Cerebellum (IX) 445 6.40 10 -58 -40 
L Cerebellum (IX) 445 5.30 -14 -60 -36 
 Cerebellar Vermis (9) 445 4.50 2 -52 -32 
L Cerebellum (Crus 2) 420 7.85 -14 -82 -36 
L Cerebellum (VIII) 420 4.55 -14 -70 -30 
L Cuneus 710 6.56 -10 -96 22 
R Superior Occipital Gyrus 710 6.26 16 -94 28 
L Lingual Gyrus 710 6.08 -12 -78 0 
L Calcarine Gyrus 710 5.84 -8 -86 6 
L Calcarine Gyrus 710 5.77 -4 -94 12 
R Calcarine Gyrus 710 5.75 12 -92 18 
R Calcarine Gyrus 710 4.94 10 -100 14 
L Cuneus 710 4.20 0 -92 22 
R Cerebellum (VII) 320 6.21 12 -80 -36 
R Cerebellum (Crus 1) 320 5.87 22 -76 -34 
R Cerebellum (Crus 1) 320 5.21 22 -84 -24 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 275 6.06 54 30 -2 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 275 5.62 44 32 -2 
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 275 5.11 58 32 14 
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 275 5.05 58 34 6 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 275 4.92 50 30 -10 
R Hippocampus 153 5.83 32 -12 -16 
R Hippocampus 153 5.56 20 -8 -14 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus 153 4.95 30 -2 -24 
R Hippocampus 153 4.91 28 -20 -14 
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 28 5.53 -24 -36 -12 
L Hippocampus 78 5.03 -22 -24 -12 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 87 5.23 -22 22 44 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 87 4.75 -24 34 56 
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R Cerebellum (VI) 32 5.06 18 -70 -24 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 24 4.57 -8 38 50 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 24 4.48 -14 40 56 
Note. Maximum peaks are corrected for multiple comparisons by means of Monte 
Carlo simulation. The simulation resulted in a voxel-wise threshold of p < 
.0001 and a minimum cluster size of range 21-24 voxels for the whole brain, 
corresponding to p < .05, Family-Wise Error (FWE) corrected for the whole 
brain. Table shows all local maxima separated by more than 8 mm. Regions were 
automatically labeled using the Anatomy Toolbox atlas. L/R = left and right 
hemispheres, respectively; equal cluster size values indicate peak voxels are 
part of a contiguous cluster; t-value refers to peak activation level in each 
cluster; x, y, and z = Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates in 
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, 
respectively; IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus; MCC = Mid Cingulate Cortex. 
 
Figure 2 
Neural Correlates of Situated Fear 
 
Note. Shown above from left to right are sagittal, coronal, and axial views 
of global maxima for the fear manipulation in the non-social condition (top; 
MNI coordinate [-6, -36, 44]) and social condition (bottom; MNI coordinate 
[50, -68, 8]). 
 
Situated Sadness 
 We predicted, and found, that the neural correlates of the emotion 
category sadness differed across social and non-social conditions. Relative 
to all other conditions, sadness in the non-social condition was 
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characterized by increased activation in the occipital cortex (t > 4.05, k > 
21, p < .0001; p < .05, FWE corrected). In contrast, sadness in the social 
condition was characterized by increased activation in lateral and medial 
OFC, lateral and medial temporal cortex (including the amygdala), visual 
cortex and the cerebellum relative to all other conditions (t > 4.05, k > 24, 
p < .0001; p < .05, FWE corrected) (see Table 2, Figure 3). 
Table 2 
Neural Regions Showing Significant Activation During Non-Social and Social 
Conditions of Sadness Relative to All Other Conditions 
Contrast: [Non-Social Sadness > All] MNI 
L/R Region Cluster 
size 
t-value x y z 
L Cerebellum (VI) 9528 11.04 -20 -74 -8 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 9528 10.73 -28 -88 12 
L Lingual Gyrus 9528 10.33 -10 -78 -4 
R Lingual Gyrus 9528 9.36 6 -86 4 
L Fusiform Gyrus 9528 9.02 -28 -66 -8 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 9528 8.80 32 -82 22 
R Fusiform Gyrus 9528 8.75 24 -76 -8 
R Fusiform Gyrus 9528 8.70 28 -58 -6 
R Lingual Gyrus 9528 8.61 16 -78 -6 
L Calcarine Gyrus 9528 8.54 -8 -92 0 
R Fusiform Gyrus 9528 8.52 30 -40 -10 
L Fusiform Gyrus 9528 8.42 -30 -50 -10 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 9528 8.27 -32 -88 22 
R Lingual Gyrus 9528 8.15 16 -90 -2 
R Lingual Gyrus 9528 8.08 6 -78 -4 
R Fusiform Gyrus 9528 8.05 24 -68 -6 
       
Contrast: [Social Sadness > All] MNI 
L/R Region Cluster 
size 
t-value x y z 
R Fusiform Gyrus 13771 14.78 42 -44 -16 
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 13771 14.11 46 -66 -10 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 13771 12.75 -46 -70 12 
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 13771 12.50 38 -82 -4 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 13771 12.42 -44 -80 2 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 13771 12.36 -44 -74 -6 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 13771 12.11 -36 -86 -4 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 13771 11.93 50 -72 10 
L Fusiform Gyrus 13771 11.91 -42 -50 -18 
R Fusiform Gyrus 13771 11.91 40 -60 -12 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 13771 11.57 46 -62 16 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 13771 11.22 48 -72 2 
L Fusiform Gyrus 13771 10.63 -38 -66 -14 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 13771 10.16 50 -62 0 
R Fusiform Gyrus 13771 8.80 28 -88 -2 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 13771 8.34 -40 -60 18 
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R Superior Temporal Gyrus 13771 7.82 54 -42 16 
L Fusiform Gyrus 13771 7.79 -38 -60 -6 
R Amygdala 6395 10.34 26 -2 -16 
R Amygdala 6395 9.49 20 -6 -12 
L Amygdala 6395 8.54 -20 -8 -12 
L Temporal Pole 6395 8.41 -28 2 -24 
R Temporal Pole 6395 8.26 36 4 -18 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 6395 8.10 52 -8 -14 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 6395 7.92 54 0 -18 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) 6395 7.64 -26 14 -18 
L Amygdala 6395 7.51 -24 -4 -18 
L Temporal Pole 6395 7.30 -36 4 -14 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 6395 7.13 24 14 -18 
L Insula 6395 7.03 -24 14 -18 
R IFG (p. Opercularis) 6395 6.96 48 6 34 
L Cerebellum (VII) 520 10.05 -8 -76 -38 
L Cerebellum (VI) 520 6.26 -10 -70 -22 
L Cerebellum (VIII) 520 5.33 -22 -68 -44 
R Rectal Gyrus 597 9.08 2 46 -16 
R Cerebellum (VII) 110 8.37 10 -78 -40 
R Superior Medial Gyrus 716 8.21 4 52 32 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 716 6.56 -4 48 36 
R Superior Medial Gyrus 716 4.69 10 56 42 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 716 4.20 -12 62 34 
L Cerebellum (IX) 406 7.49 -2 -52 -34 
R Cerebellum (IX) 406 7.48 4 -56 -44 
L Cerebellum (IX) 406 5.15 -14 -44 -40 
R Cerebellum (IX) 406 4.45 10 -54 -36 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 393 7.38 30 -52 58 
R Cerebellum (X) 74 6.73 20 -40 -40 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 224 6.59 -60 -2 -14 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 224 5.77 -56 -10 -10 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 224 4.83 -52 2 -18 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 47 5.76 -34 -6 -32 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 143 5.59 42 2 58 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 143 4.81 40 2 46 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 143 4.17 38 0 66 
R Postcentral Gyrus 123 5.23 50 -24 38 
R Postcentral Gyrus 123 4.92 60 -18 36 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 123 4.63 58 -26 28 
R Postcentral Gyrus 123 4.21 60 -22 48 
R Cerebellum (VI) 27 4.92 10 -72 -18 
R Posterior-Medial Frontal 59 4.86 6 12 62 
R Posterior-Medial Frontal 59 4.79 4 8 72 
Note. Maximum peaks are corrected for multiple comparisons by means of Monte 
Carlo simulation. The simulation resulted in a voxel-wise threshold of p < 
.0001 and a minimum cluster size of range 21-24 voxels for the whole brain, 
corresponding to p < .05, Family-Wise Error (FWE) corrected for the whole 
brain. Table shows all local maxima separated by more than 8 mm. Regions were 
automatically labeled using the Anatomy Toolbox atlas. L/R = left and right 
hemispheres, respectively; equal cluster size values indicate peak voxels are 
part of a contiguous cluster; t-value refers to peak activation level in each 
cluster; x, y, and z = Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates in 
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, 




Neural Correlates of Situated Sadness 
 
Note. Shown above from left to right are sagittal, coronal, and axial views 
of global maxima for the sadness manipulation in the non-social condition 
(top; MNI coordinate [-20, -74, -8]) and social condition (bottom; MNI 
coordinate [42, -44, -16]). 
 
Culture by Emotion 
 We predicted, and found, that the neural correlates of the emotion 
category sadness differed between Chinese Native and European-American 
participants (clusters of activation for the emotion category fear did not 
survive FWE correction). Across all instances of sadness, European-American 
participants showed greater activation in visual areas relative to their 
Chinese Native counterparts (t > 3.29, k > 288, p < .001; p < .05, FWE 
corrected) (see Table 3, Figure 4). Chinese Natives did not show any areas of 





Neural Regions Showing Significant Cultural Differences During the Sadness 
Condition 
European-American > Chinese Native for the Sadness 
Condition 
MNI 
L/R Region Cluster 
size  
t-value x y z 
L Calcarine Gyrus 329 4.84 -8 -88 14 
L Calcarine Gyrus 329 4.30 -10 -76 18 
L Calcarine Gyrus 329 4.02 -2 -72 24 
L Calcarine Gyrus 329 3.96 2 -90 6 
L Lingual Gyrus 329 3.87 0 -82 4 
Note. Maximum peaks are corrected for multiple comparisons by means of Monte 
Carlo simulation. The simulation resulted in a voxel-wise threshold of p < 
.001 and a minimum cluster size of 288 voxels for the whole brain, 
corresponding to p < .05, Family-Wise Error (FWE) corrected for the whole 
brain. Table shows all local maxima separated by more than 8 mm. Regions were 
automatically labeled using the Anatomy Toolbox atlas. L/R = left and right 
hemispheres, respectively; equal cluster size values indicate peak voxels are 
part of a contiguous cluster; t-value refers to peak activation level in each 
cluster; x, y, and z = Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates in 




Neural Correlates of Sadness by Culture 
 
Note. Shown above from left to right are sagittal, coronal, and axial views 
of global maxima (MNI coordinate [-8, -88, 14]) for European-American > 
Chinese Native in the Sadness condition. 
 
Culture by Emotion by Situation 
 We predicted, and found, that the neural correlates of the emotion 
category sadness differed across social and non-social conditions between 
Chinese Native and European-American participants (clusters of activation for 
situated instances of fear did not survive FWE correction). Relative to their 
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Chinese Native counterparts, European-American participants showed greater 
activation in the supramarginal gyrus during the sadness manipulation in the 
non-social condition (t > 3.29, k > 61, p < .0001; p < .05, FWE corrected). 
European-American participants also showed greater activation in visual areas 
during the sadness manipulation in the social condition (t > 3.29, k > 279, p 
< .001; p < .05, FWE corrected) relative to their Chinese Native counterparts 
(Table 4, Figure 5). Chinese Natives did not show any areas of significantly 
greater activation in either sadness condition relative to their European-
American counterparts. 
Table 4 
Neural Regions Showing Significant Cultural Differences During the Non-Social 
and Social Conditions of Sadness 
European-American > Chinese Native for the Sadness 
Manipulation in the Non-Social Condition 
MNI 
L/R Region Cluster 
size  
t-value x y z 
L Supramarginal Gyrus 96 5.81 38 -36 42 
  
European-American > Chinese Native for the Sadness 
Manipulation in the Social Condition 
MNI 
L/R Region Cluster 
size  
t-value x y z 
L Calcarine Gyrus 325  4.94 -8 -88 14 
L Calcarine Gyrus 325  4.30 -10 -76 18 
L Calcarine Gyrus 325  4.08 2 -90 6 
L Calcarine Gyrus 325  3.94 -2 -72 24 
L Lingual Gyrus 325  3.92 0 -82 4 
R Lingual Gyrus 325  3.39 6 -76 10 
Note. Maximum peaks are corrected for multiple comparisons by means of Monte 
Carlo simulation. The simulation resulted in a voxel-wise threshold of p < 
.001 and a minimum cluster size of 61-279 voxels for the whole brain, 
corresponding to p < .05, Family-Wise Error (FWE) corrected for the whole 
brain. Table shows all local maxima separated by more than 8 mm. Regions were 
automatically labeled using the Anatomy Toolbox atlas. L/R = left and right 
hemispheres, respectively; equal cluster size values indicate peak voxels are 
part of a contiguous cluster; t-value refers to peak activation level in each 
cluster; x, y, and z = Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates in 





Neural Correlates of Situated Sadness by Culture 
 
Note. Shown above from left to right are sagittal, coronal, and axial views 
of global maxima for cultural differences for the sadness manipulation in the 
non-social condition (top; MNI coordinate [38, -36, 42]) and social condition 
(bottom; MNI coordinate [-8, -88, 14]). 
 
Emotion and Exposure to Western Culture 
Lastly, to further address the role that cultural context could have on 
emotional brain states, we also examined the effect of exposure to Western 
culture, operationalized as standardized time (in months) spent in the US. 
Here, we also found a significant effect such that the longer an individual 
had resided in the United States, the greater the activation within right 
supramarginal gyrus during the sadness manipulation in the non-social 
condition (t = 5.56, k = 67, p < .0001; p < .05, FWE corrected; MNI 
coordinate [36, -38, 42]). These findings suggest that the longer Chinese 
individuals had spent in the US, the more their brain responses to non-social 




Here we provide evidence that social and cultural context separately 
and together alter brain activity during emotion experience. Social instances 
of fear involved activation in areas associated with biological motion 
(supramarginal gyrus; Felician et al., 2009) and mentalizing (temporal pole; 
Spiers & Maguire, 2006), whereas non-social instances involved activation in 
areas involved in motor action (MCC; Gazzola & Keysers, 2008) and affective 
modulation of vision (OFC; Barrett & Bar, 2009). Social and non-social 
sadness were each also associated with a distinct set of regions. During 
social instances of sadness there was increased activity within regions 
associated with awareness of body states (insula; Craig, 2011), affective 
salience (amygdala; Lindquist et al., 2012), semantic knowledge (IFG; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and mentalizing (temporal pole; Spiers & 
Maguire, 2006), whereas non-social sadness was associated with visual 
salience (occipital cortex) and locating objects in space (parahippocampus; 
Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004).  
 Brain representations of an emotion category also differed between 
individuals from different cultures. During instances of sadness, European-
Americans had greater activation within visual cortex than Chinese Natives; 
this was especially the case for social sadness. The existing literature 
points to cultural differences in the perception of facial portrayals of 
emotion (Chiao et al., 2008; Derntl et al., 2012; Moriguchi et al., 2005; de 
Greck et al., 2012) but to our knowledge, our findings are the first to 
indicate culture moderates the neural correlates of emotional experience. 
Critically, neural representations of sadness were subject to exposure to 
Western culture. The longer Chinese Natives resided in the US, the more alike 
the activation in their supramarginal gyrus was to that of European-Americans 
during non-social instances of sadness. Evidence is suggestive that 
“emotional acculturation” occurs as immigrants begin to exhibit the emotional 
 24 
tendencies that are most typical in their host country (De Leersnyder, 2017). 
Our findings may indicate that emotional acculturation could be reflected in 
functional brain activation related to the amount of exposure, in months, to 
Western culture.  
 Our study was limited by several factors. First, although images are 
generally robust and reliable inducers of emotion (Lench et al. 2011), they 
may not reflect the full range or depth of emotional experiences that 
individuals have in daily life. We used an image set that was normed in a US 
sample; our results might therefore differ if we selected images that better 
characterized emotional life in Mainland China.  
Second, we only manipulated the social aspects of the situation, but as 
our appraisal analyses of fear show, there are multiple dimensions on which 
situations differ. Our findings underscore that there may be myriad situated 
neural configurations for an emotion category.  
Third, we recruited individuals who were raised in Mainland China but 
living in the US and thus may be underestimating cultural differences in 
emotional brain activity. Indeed, the observed acculturation effect suggests 
that the length of time that Chinese participants were exposed to American 
cultural norms predicted the extent to which their brain activity resembled 
that of US participants during non-social instances of sadness. It bears note 
that cultural origin is only one possible operationalization of culture; 
culture is itself a multi-faceted construct and it would be interesting to 
examine how other aspects of culture impact emotional brain states. 
In total, our findings are consistent with theoretical models in which 
emotions are predictions highly tuned to the situation (Barrett, 2006; 
Frijda, 1988; Moors et al., 2013; Scherer, 2009; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and 
suggest that the context in which an instance of emotion occurs is 
inextricably linked to the physiological manifestation of that emotion. Our 
findings add to growing evidence that emotion categories such as “fear” and 
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“sadness” are not each represented by an invariant brain state, but are 
collections of instances “constructed” via processes such visceromotor 
responses, motivated behaviors, and representations of goals and prior 
experiences (Cunningham et al., 2013; Guillory & Bujarski, 2014; Lindquist, 
2013; Pessoa, 2018; Raz et al., 2016; Riedel et al., 2018; Smith & Lane, 
2015) that are adaptive responses to the immediate and cultural context. 
Humans may essentialize discrete emotion categories because we name them with 
a single term (e.g., “fear”) (Lindquist et al., 2013), but this does not mean 
there is a singular process that is associated with that state. Indeed, even 
in non-human animals, multiple neural circuits flexibly support defensive 
behaviors in the face of threat (Gross & Canteras, 2012).  
A situated model of emotion has important applications. If 
neurobiological investigations of emotional disorder rely on the assumption 
that each emotion is associated with an invariant brain state, then attempts 
at intervention may fail (e.g., Shankman & Gorka, 2015). Technology that 
seeks to “read” emotional brain states may be unsuccessful without explicitly 
modeling the context in which emotion categories occur. Indeed, machines with 
the capacity to encode scene context are better at recognizing emotional 
states in humans than those without this capacity (Kosti et al., 2017; Kosti 
et al., 2019). If emotions are ultimately situated phenomena, then future 
research must continue to model and quantify the extent to which the emotion 
category being experienced and the forms of context in which it is 
experienced interact to shape neural responses. Doing so may be fundamental 
to understanding how the human brain creates emotions. 
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APPENDIX 1: MAIN EFFECTS OF EMOTION AND SITUATION 
Listed below are neural regions showing significant activation during 
the emotion and social conditions in the main effects; significant brain 
activation associated with these conditions is relative to baseline (i.e., 
the jittered inter-trial periods [ISIs]). Maximum peaks are corrected for 
multiple comparisons by means of Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation 
resulted in a voxel-wise threshold of p < .0001 and a minimum cluster size of 
range 57-63 voxels for the whole brain, corresponding to p < .05, Family-Wise 
Error (FWE) corrected for the whole brain. 
Coordinates were gathered using bspmview via MATLAB. The tables below 
show all local maxima separated by more than 18 mm. Regions were 
automatically labeled using the Anatomy Toolbox atlas. L/R = left and right 
hemispheres, respectively; equal cluster size values indicate peak voxels are 
part of a contiguous cluster; t-value refers to peak activation level in each 
cluster; x, y, and z = Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates in 
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, 
respectively; IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus; MCC = Mid Cingulate Cortex. 
Fear Condition MNI 




x y z 
R Lingual Gyrus 40050 27.07 6 -84 0 
R Fusiform Gyrus 40050 19.42 36 -42 -18 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus 40050 19.40 -14 -96 22 
L Hippocampus 40050 18.80 -18 -30 -2 
L Fusiform Gyrus 40050 18.27 -38 -52 -16 
R Hippocampus 40050 17.83 20 -28 0 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 40050 17.78 44 -76 -2 
L Lingual Gyrus 40050 17.52 -28 -88 -8 
R Calcarine Gyrus 40050 17.26 12 -94 16 
L Precentral Gyrus 40050 15.32 -58 6 36 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 40050 15.21 34 -86 16 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 40050 14.25 -36 -86 16 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 40050 12.42 -48 -72 12 
L IFG (p. Opercularis) 40050 12.03 -40 6 34 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) 40050 11.86 -30 26 -2 
L Posterior-Medial Frontal 3072 14.07 -4 12 54 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 3072 7.11 -12 42 54 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 3072 6.51 -10 62 34 
R Posterior-Medial Frontal 3072 6.24 8 -2 56 
L Cerebellum (IX) 869 13.01 -2 -54 -34 
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R Cerebellum (VIII) 869 7.26 32 -64 -48 
R Insula Lobe 3961  10.57 32 24 2 
R IFG (p. Opercularis) 3961  10.18 44 6 34 
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 3961  8.75 56 32 24 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 3961  7.03 54 30 -2 
R Temporal Pole 3961  6.07 44 18 -18 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 3961  5.21 36 -6 68 
L Putamen 816 10.53 -28 -2 0 
R Postcentral Gyrus 261 7.66 44 -24 48 
R Pallidum 447 7.25 22 2 8 
 
Sadness Condition MNI 




x y z 
R Lingual Gyrus 41105  27.38 6 -84 0 
L Hippocampus 41105  20.63 -18 -30 -2 
R Fusiform Gyrus 41105  20.40 36 -42 -18 
L Lingual Gyrus 41105  19.42 -10 -90 -6 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 41105  18.69 -36 -84 -6 
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 41105  18.45 42 -66 -10 
L Fusiform Gyrus 41105  18.37 -40 -52 -16 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus 41105  18.26 -14 -96 22 
R Calcarine Gyrus 41105  17.39 12 -94 16 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 41105  16.22 30 -84 24 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 41105  15.57 -36 -86 16 
L Precentral Gyrus 41105  14.82 -58 6 36 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) 41105  13.01 -30 26 -2 
L Cerebellum (IX) 1067  14.89 -2 -54 -34 
L Cerebellum (X) 1067  8.50 -20 -38 -40 
R Cerebellum (VIII) 1067  7.39 32 -64 -48 
L Posterior-Medial Frontal 2734  14.08 -2 10 56 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 2734  7.01 -12 62 34 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 2734  6.09 -10 42 54 
R IFG (p. Opercularis) 3868  11.09 48 8 34 
R Insula Lobe 3868  11.06 32 24 2 
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 3868  7.86 44 28 20 
R Temporal Pole 3868  6.24 38 16 -22 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 3868  4.59 40 0 64 
R Postcentral Gyrus 374 8.17 44 -24 48 
R Putamen 474 6.87 24 0 8 
L Amygdala 62 7.04 -20 -6 -14 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus 101 6.30 18 -8 -18 
 
Neutral Condition MNI 




x y z 
R Lingual Gyrus 35309  23.76 8 -84 0 
L Lingual Gyrus 35309  19.66 -10 -88 -6 
R Fusiform Gyrus 35309  19.27 36 -42 -20 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus 35309  18.61 -14 -96 22 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 35309  17.27 -36 -84 -6 
L Fusiform Gyrus 35309  16.34 -38 -52 -14 
R Calcarine Gyrus 35309  15.61 14 -92 18 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 35309  13.91 32 -84 22 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 35309  12.75 -36 -86 18 
L Precentral Gyrus 35309  11.14 -46 6 36 
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L Postcentral Gyrus 35309  10.92 -42 -26 58 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) 35309  10.63 -30 24 -4 
L IFG (p. Triangularis) 35309  10.33 -54 20 12 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 35309  9.57 48 -74 14 
L Posterior-Medial Frontal 2427  13.01 -4 10 54 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 2427  9.30 -6 26 40 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 608 10.62 32 26 0 
R IFG (p. Opercularis) 2089  9.17 54 14 34 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 2089  8.27 52 32 28 
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 2089  5.89 58 24 8 
L Cerebellum (IX) 161 8.86 -2 -54 -34 
L Putamen 580 8.39 -28 -2 0 
R Putamen 263 6.78 26 2 4 
R Postcentral Gyrus 242 6.47 40 -26 46 
R Cerebellum (VIII) 61 5.99 30 -66 -48 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 79 5.68 -52 -34 2 
R Cerebellum (IX) 59 5.48 14 -60 -42 
 
Social Condition MNI 




x y z 
R Lingual Gyrus 40787  25.50 8 -84 0 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus 40787  19.28 -14 -96 22 
L Hippocampus 40787  19.22 -18 -30 -2 
L Lingual Gyrus 40787  19.09 -10 -88 -6 
R Fusiform Gyrus 40787  18.99 38 -44 -18 
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 40787  17.74 42 -78 -2 
L Fusiform Gyrus 40787  17.06 -38 -52 -16 
R Calcarine Gyrus 40787  17.03 12 -94 16 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 40787  15.11 30 -84 24 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 40787  14.89 -36 -86 16 
L Precentral Gyrus 40787  14.66 -58 6 36 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) 40787  12.75 -30 26 -2 
L IFG (p. Triangularis) 40787  11.88 -54 20 12 
L Cerebellum (IX) 925  14.33 -2 -54 -34 
L Cerebellum (X) 925  8.25 -20 -38 -40 
R Cerebellum (VIII) 925  7.42 32 -64 -48 
L Posterior-Medial Frontal 3240  13.95 -4 10 54 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 3240  7.62 -2 42 42 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 4401  11.27 32 24 0 
R IFG (p. Opercularis) 4401  10.75 44 6 34 
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 4401  8.53 58 28 6 
R Temporal Pole 4401  7.75 38 14 -24 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 4401  5.39 36 -6 68 
L Putamen 760 9.91 -28 -4 2 
R Putamen 520 7.70 24 0 8 
R Postcentral Gyrus 243 7.09 44 -24 48 
L Cerebellum (VIII) 72 6.25 -34 -62 -50 
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